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I. INTRODUCTION
Clinical education has progressed through astonishing permuta-
tions during the last two decades.1 Experiential learning,2 the crux of
clinical legal pedagogy, was initially the province of practitioners only
marginally admitted into the sanctuary of law school education. Now
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supportive environments within which we may pursue our scholarly interests. The authors also
wish to thank Milan Dey-Chao for her diligence, much-appreciated research and editorial assis-
tance, and late nights; Darice Guzman, Jenna Anderson, Joanna Tomas, and Steve Madra for
their invaluable research assistance; Lisa Bloch Herman, Brian Gorman, and Alison Bloom for
their retrospective reflections on the value of Therapeutic Jurisprudence to their field placement
work; and Lisa for her work on the "Alan Andrews" case.
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1. See Louise G. Trubeck, U.S. Legal Education and Legal Services for the Indigent: A His-
torical and Personal Perspective, 5 MD. J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 381 (1994). See also Peter
A. Joy, Political Interference with Clinical Legal Education: Denying Access to Justice, 74 TUL. L.
REV. 235, 265-67 (1999).
2. For the purposes of this Article, the phrase "experiential learning" will be used to de-
scribe the "hands-on" learning that comes about when representing clients in live-client clinics,
extemships, and simulation courses. In the context of clinical legal education, experiential learn-
ing also embodies training in how to learn from experience and the taking of responsibility by a
student for his or her own learning. Through such learning, students develop an awareness of
role identity as well as legal skills proficiency. Linda Morton, Creating a Classroom Component
for Field Placement Programs: Enhancing Clinical Goals with Feminist Pedagogy, 45 ME. L. REV.
19, 20-21 (1993); Linda F. Smith, Pedagogy in Designing an ExterAi Clinical Program: Or as You
Sow, So Shall You Reap, 5 CLINICAL L. REV. 527, 530 (1999).
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it is seen, albeit grudgingly by many traditionalists, as an important
aspect of law school education.' For those, like us, who envision law
school as a "holistic"4 means of bridging the gap between practical
substance and methodology and traditional course content, we wish to
propose a teaching paradigm that integrates the positive aspects of
both educational approaches. This Article attempts to do just that:
juxtapose the experiential learning found in clinical courses with the
theoretical premises of therapeutic jurisprudence.
Therapeutic jurisprudence (TJ) has been hailed as a means of
viewing the law as a potentially therapeutic agent, giving law practi-
tioners the means to explore the extent to which legal roles influence
legal process and, conversely, how legal process may affect legal roles.'
The study of legal process should begin at the point in which it is
taught and absorbed by law students and new lawyers. One would
think, therefore, that legal education-a subject that has been decon-
structed from every imaginable perspective over the past decade 6-
would be a natural laboratory for TJ inquiries, especially given the
universal level of dissatisfaction that law students report.7 Yet, just as
3. TASK FORCE ON LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PROFESSION: NARROWING THE GAP,
SECTION OF LEGAL EDUCATION AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIA-
TION, LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT: AN EDUCATIONAL CON-
TINUUM (Robert MacCrate ed., 1992). See also Steven Keeva, Profiting from Experience, ABA
J., April 1999, at 56; Thomas A. Mauet & Dominic J. Gianna, Tomorrow Litigation Training for
the Next Century, LITIGATION, Winter 2000, at 12-14.
4. For views on holistic lawyering, see Thomas A. Dye, Law School's Contribution to Civil-
ity and Character, 22 LAW PRAC. MGMT. 40 (1996), and William van Zyverden, Holistic Law-
yering: A Comprehensive Approach to Dispute Resolution, 3 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 5 (1993).
5. Amiram Elwork & G. Andrews H. Benjamin, Lawyers in Distress, 23 J. PSYCHIATRY &
L. 205 (1995), reprinted in LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY: DEVELOPMENTS IN THERAPEUTIC
JURISPRUDENCE 569 (David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick eds., 1996) [hereinafter LAW IN A
THERAPEUTIC KEY]; Michael L. Perlin, A Law of Healing, 68 U. CINN. L. REV. 407, 412-13
(2000).
6. See, e.g., Frank S. Bloch, The Andragogical Basis of Clinical Legal Education, 35 VAND.
L. REV. 321 (1982); George Critchlow, Professional Responsibility, Student Practice, and the Clin-
ical Teacher's Duty to Intervene, 26 GONZ. L. REV. 415 (1991)(ethical perspective); Jonathan
Rose, The MacCrate Report's Restatement of Legal Education: The Need for Reflection and Horse
Sense, 44 J. LEGAL EDUC. 548 (1994), excerpted in CLINICAL ANTHOLOGY, READINGS FOR
LIVE-CLIENT CLINICS 20 (Alex J. Hurder et al. eds., 1997)(skills training perspective);
Trubeck, supra note 1 (social lawyering perspective); K.C. Worden, Overshooting the Target: A
Feminist Deconstruction of Legal Education, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 1141 (1985) (feminist perspec-
tive).
7. See Report of the AALS Special Committee on Problems of Substance Abuse in the Law
Schools, 44 J. LEGAL EDUC. 35 (1994); James J. Alfini & Joseph N. Van Vooren, Is There a Solu-
tion to the Problem of Lawyer Stress?: The Law School Perspective, 10 J.L. & HEALTH 61 (1996);
Joanne Martin & Bryant G. Garth, Clinical Education as a Bridge Between Law School and Prac-
tice: Mitigating the Misery, 1 CLINICAL L. REV. 443 (1994). Studies confirm the common
experience of student distress during law school and the negative public perception of lawyers;
simple observation of lawyer behavior shows that lawyers as a group to be stressed and relatively
unhappy people. See Smith, supra note 2, at 537; Lawrence S. Krieger, What We Are Not Telling
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there is minimal literature on TJ and the practice of law, there has
been, to our knowledge, only a few other applications of TJ to any
aspect of legal education.8
In particular, TJ seems a natural "fit" with clinical legal educa-
tion. Clinical courses, whether live-client clinics, externships, or sim-
ulation courses, tend to focus on ethics, interpersonal communication,
and collaboration among students, faculty, and clients under very dif-
ferent circumstances than those found in a traditional law school class.
Clinical work is both a more stressful and a more exhilarating educa-
tional experience for most students.' Nowhere else in a law school will
students confront first-hand the diversity of a poverty practice," be
challenged on their reflections of their experiences, and be forced to
integrate new doctrine, theory, and practice."
Law Students and Lawyers-That They Really Need to Know: Thoughts in Action Toward Revital-
izing the Profession from Its Roots, 13 J. L. & Health 1 (1998-1999).
8. Very recently, Psychology, Public Policy, and Law published a special theme issue:
Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Preventive Law: Transforming Legal Practice and Education, 5
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 795 (1999). See also Elwork & Benjamin, supra note 5 (looking to
the principals of therapeutic jurisprudence to suggest a means of reducing distress in lawyers and
law students); Dennis P. Stolle & David B. Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Preventive
Law: A Combined Concentration to Invigorate the Everyday Practice of Law, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 25
(1997) (using seminars on TJ to discuss preventive law and the concept of legal checkups); David
B. Wexler, Some Thoughts and Observations on Teaching Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 35 REV. D.P.
273 (1996).
9. "The gaps between knowledge and skill, on the one hand, and role demands, on the
other, contribute to a high level of anxiety in most students." Kenneth R. Kreiling, Clinical Edu-
cation and Lawyer Competency: The Process of Learning to Learn from Experience Through Pro-
perly Structured Clinical Supervision, 40 MD. L. REV. 284, 287 (1981). Prior to entering law
school, students have few models for counseling, which seems to require a daunting mix of judg-
ment and skill. Robert Dinerstein, Client-Centered Counseling: Reappraisal and Refinement, 32
ARIZ. L. REV. 501, 509 (1990).
10. A majority of law school clinics represent only indigent clients. Historically, this grew
out of the 1960s explosion in poverty law practice and governmental programs; the period was
also marked by an increase in activism in social movements. Later, in 1974, the legislative
history of the Legal Services Corporation supported a vision of law school involvement with
federally funded legal services. Trubeck, supra note 1, at 385. Concurrently, beginning in the
1960s, the Council on Legal Education for Professional Responsibility (CLEPR) was promoting
programs, which later became clinics, tying together the pro bono role of the profession, the
public service obligations of law schools, and the utilization and education of law students. Id. at
385.
The issue of defining the mission of law school clinics and who such clinics represent remains
at the forefront of clinical scholarship. Nina W. Tarr, Current Issues in Clinical Legal Education,
37 HOW. L.J. 31, 33 (1993) (arguing the importance of a poverty perspective). See Joy, supra
note 1. But see Gary Laser, Significant Curricular Developments: The MacCrate Report and
Beyond, 1 CLINICAL L. REV. 425, 441 (1994) (fee-generating in-house clinic meets law school's
obligation to provide best possible legal education to produce competent, ethical, and reflective
practitioners).
11. See Kreiling, supra note 9, at 287. The emergence of critical lawyering theory, theoret-
ics of practice scholarship, and the influence of other postmodernist schools of legal thought have
heightened the academy's interest in concepts of client and community empowerment and in
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This Article has been generated from our experiences as clinical
education teachers and TJ scholars. Recently, we combined these two
"hats." Michael L. Perlin (MLP) teaches a Mental Disability Litiga-
tion Seminar and Workshop and a Seminar in Therapeutic Jurispru-
dence. Keri K. Gould (KKG) teaches an intensive trial advocacy
course, Mental Health Law, and, as the Assistant Dean for Extern-
ships, she has created the curriculum for, and taught in, a variety of
externship courses. KKG's latest clinical teaching endeavor is a new
domestic violence family court litigation clinic. In these courses, each
of us has made an effort to specifically incorporate TJ into our teach-
ing philosophy and methodologies, our practice of law, and our
critique of other lawyering observed by our students.
12
Our thesis is both simple and modest: therapeutic jurisprudence
provides a new and exciting approach to clinical teaching. By incorpo-
rating TJ principles in both the classroom and out-of-classroom com-
ponents of clinic courses, law professors can give students new and
important insights into some of the most difficult problems regularly
raised in clinical classes and practice settings.
This Article will proceed in three sections. The first section
briefly provides some background about TJ and how it has been
employed to investigate other areas of the law. Then, the Article dis-
cusses some of the important new theoretical developments in clinical
legal education, mostly from the "critical lawyering" perspective.
Finally, in the last section, the Article illustrates the use of TJ as a
paradigm for teaching in the clinical law setting-both to encourage,
shape, and inform classroom discussions, and to teach specific lawyer-
ing skills. We will conclude with some brief recommendations and
suggestions.
Thirty-five years ago, Bob Dylan electrified his fans with the
song, Subterranean Homesick Blues (which contains the often-cited
line, "You don't need a weatherman to know which way the wind
blows"). 3 The song begins with the lines, "Johnny's in the basement/
transforming the social consciousness of law students by deconstructing power and privilege in
law. John C. Dubin, Clinical Design for Social Justice Imperatives, 51 SMU L. REV. 1461, 1469
(1998).
12. Although at this point in our careers we are both involved with clinical placement
courses, we both have taught in in-house clinics and have logged substantial numbers of years as
attorneys representing institutionalized psychiatric patients. MLP was the Director of the Divi-
sion of Mental Health Advocacy in the New Jersey Department of the Public Advocate, and
KKG was a senior attorney for New York's Mental Hygiene Legal Service.
This is apparently the second article to discuss this intersection. See Mary Berkheiser, Fra-
sier Meets CLEA: Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Law School Clinics, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y &
L. 1147, 1148 n.4 (1999) (discussing an earlier draft of this article).
13. BOB DYLAN, Subterranean Homesick Blues, on BRINGING IT ALL BACK HOME
[Vol. 24:339
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Mixing up his medicine. ' 14  This couplet serves as an appropriate
epigram for this entire inquiry.
Clinics have traditionally been relegated to "basement" status,
both literally and figuratively."5 Other law professors often had only
the vaguest idea about what really does go on in clinical education.16
In this article, we contend that the incorporation of TJ into clinical
methods can be a tonic'T-for students, for teachers, and ultimately,
for case clients. Like Dylan's protagonist, we "mix up the medicine,"
and offer it to our colleagues as a remedy for much that ails the clinical
learning process.
II. THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE
In the past ten years, the microuniverse of "mental disability law
scholars" has turned its attention with increasing frequency to the area
of TJ. Therapeutic jurisprudence proponents argue that all legal
interactions may have therapeutic or antitherapeutic effects, view the
law as a potentially "therapeutic agent,"' 8 and characterize TJ as a
(Columbia Records 1965). This couplet has been cited by many courts. See, e.g., Ball v. Posey,
222 Cal. Rptr. 746, 749 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985); Easton v. Strassburger, 199 Cal. Rptr. 383, 392
(Cal. Ct. App. 1984); Godfrey v. Steinpress, 180 Cal. Rptr. 95, 112 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982); Jor-
gensen v. Beach 'N' Bay Realty, Inc., 177 Cal. Rptr. 882, 887 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981). See generally
Michael L. Perlin, "With Great Lawyers You Have Discussed": References to Bob Dylan in Pub-
lished Legal Cases, ON THE TRACKS 16, 17-18 (1995).
14. DYLAN, supra note 13.
15. Marjorie Anne McDiarmid, What's Going On Down There in the Basement: In-House
Clinics Expand Their Beachhead, 35 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 239 (1990).
16. Id. Despite the official recognition, clinical scholarship was, and to some extent contin-
ues to be, largely ignored, rather than challenged in academic discourse. Minna Kotkin, Creating
True Believers: Putting Macro Theory into Practice, 5 CLINICAL L. REV. 95 (1998).
17. See Paul Appelbaum, Jacket cover to ESSAYS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE
(David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick eds., 1991) [hereinafter ESSAYS].
18. See generally ESSAYS, supra note 17; LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY, supra note 5;
PRACTICING THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: LAW AS A HELPING PROFESSION (Dennis
Stolle et al. eds., 2000) [hereinafter PRACTICING TJ]; THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: THE
LAW AS A THERAPEUTIC AGENT (David B. Wexler ed., 1990) [hereinafter THERAPEUTIC
JURISPRUDENCE]; David B. Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence: New Directions in Lawi Mental
Health Scholarship, in MENTAL HEALTH AND LAW: RESEARCH, POLICY AND SERVICES 357
(Bruce D. Sales & Saleem A. Shah eds., 1996); Michael L. Perlin, What Is Therapeutic Jurispru-
dence?, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 623 (1993); Bruce D. Sales & Daniel W. Shuman, Mental
Health Law and Mental Health Care: Introduction, 64 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 172 (1994);
Robert F. Schopp, Integrating Restorative Justice and Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 67 REV. JUR.
U.P.R. 665 (1998); David B. Wexler, Applying the Law Therapeutically, 5 APPLIED & PREVEN-
TIVE PSYCHOL. 179 (1996); David B. Wexler, Reflections on the Scope of Therapeutic Jurispru-
dence, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 220 (1995); David Wexler, An Orientation to Therapeutic
Jurisprudence, 20 N. ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 259 (1994); David B. Wexler &
Bruce J. Winick, Therapeutic Jurisprudence as a New Approach to Mental Health Law Policy
Analysis and Research, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 979 (1991); Bruce J. Winick, The Jurisprudence of
Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 184 (1997).
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"vehicle for bringing mental health insights into the law's develop-
ment."1 9 The aim is to suggest that legal decision-makers explicitly
take account of the potential impact that legal judgments may have on
an individual's psychological well-being, and in doing so, become
more sophisticated about and make better use of the insights and
methods of the behavioral sciences. 2' Therapeutic jurisprudence also
calls for the empirical audit of the law's success or failure in this
regard.21
TJ began as one of the most exciting and controversial contem-
porary developments in mental disability law, capturing the attention
of prominent forensic experts, academic psychologists, psychiatrists,
and practitioners.22 It has been the subject of symposia in law
reviews,23 special issues in behavioral and "crossover" journals, 24 aca-
demic workshops,21 and books. 26 It has been hailed by its advocates as
"a tonic for mental health law,"' 27 as a discipline "brimming" with
new ideas, ' 2' and as "provocative and compelling." 29 In recent years,
19. Michael L. Perlin, Where the Winds Hit Heavy on the Borderline: Mental Disability
Law, Theory and Practice, "Us" and "Them," 31 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 775, 784 (1998); David B.
Wexler, New Directions in Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Breaking the Bounds of Conventional Mental
Health Law Scholarship, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTs. 759, 761 (1993).
20. See David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick, Introduction to ESSAYS, supra note 17, at ix,
xi. See also Bruce Winick, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Civil Commitment Hearing, 10 J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 37, 38 (1999).
21. Id. at xi.
22. See, e.g., Symposium, Therapeutic jurisprudence: Restructuring Mental Disability Law,
10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 623 (1993); Symposium, Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Bridging the
Gap from Theory to Practice, 20 N. ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 243 (1994); Spe-
cial Section, Mental Health Law and Mental Health Care, 64 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 172
(1994); Symposium, Mental Disability Law, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 775 (1998).
23. See sources cited, supra note 22.
24. See, e.g., Special Theme, Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 1
(1995); Symposium, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Preventive Law: Transforming Legal Practice
and Education, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 795 (1999); Symposium, International Perspectives
on Therapeutic Jurisprudence, Part 1, 17 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 553 (1999); Symposium, International
Perspectives on Therapeutic Jurisprudence, Part II, 18 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 411 (2000); Dennis P.
Stolle, Advance Directives, AIDS and Mental Health: TJ Preventive Law for the HIV-Positive
Client, 4 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL'Y & L. 854 (1998); Bruce A. Arrigo & Jeffrey Tosca, Right to
Refuse Treatment, Competency to Be Executed, and Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Toward a Systemic
Analysis, 23 PSYCHOL. REv. 1 (1999).
25. See, e.g., Fifth Annual National Symposium, Mental Health and the Law: Ethical,
Therapeutic and Legal Issues in Mental Health, sponsored by Forensic and Clinical Psychology
Associates, P.A. and University of Miami Law School (Apr. 1995); Symposium, Therapeutic
Jurisprudence and the Civil Commitment Hearing, 10 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 37 (1999).
26. See, e.g., LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY, supra note 5; LAW, MENTAL HEALTH, AND
MENTAL DISORDER (Bruce D. Sales & Daniel W. Shuman eds., 1996); PRACTICING THERA-
PEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE (Dennis P. Stolle et al. eds., 2000).
27. Appelbaum, supra note 17.
28. John Monahan, Jacket cover to ESSAYS, supra note 17.
29. Bruce Sales, Jacket cover to ESSAYS, supra note 17.
[Vol. 24:339
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TJ scholars have gone far beyond the original mental health
framework and staked out compelling territory in other substantive
areas. 
30
On the other hand, TJ has not escaped criticism. The most
pointed commentary has come from John Petrila and, to a lesser
extent, from Joel Haycock and Chris Slobogin. Petrila has noted the
failure of scholars writing in this area to explicitly incorporate the
perspective of both the voluntary and involuntary consumer of mental
health services.3' In addition, Haycock has stated, "The success of
therapeutic jurisprudence will depend in part on the degree to which it
empowers the objects of therapeutic and judicial attention."32 In the
face of this criticism, David Wexler has restressed that in his model
TJ does not trump civil rights and civil liberties: "Therapeutic juris-
prudence in no way supports paternalism, coercion, or a therapeutic
state. It in no way suggests that therapeutic considerations should
,,31trump other considerations....
Subsequently, Slobogin described several of the dilemmas he sees
in the maturing therapeutic jurisprudence movement: (1) the need to
define the term "therapeutic," (2) the seemingly inevitable problems
with empirically measuring the therapeutic outcome of a given law or
procedure, and (3) the problem of potential outcome indeterminacy in
the practices and procedures viewed through the lens of therapeutic
jurisprudence.34 Likewise, MLP recently has warned that therapeutic
jurisprudence analyses must be undertaken with a full awareness of
the impact of sanism and pretextuality on all aspects of the mental
disability law system.35
30. See infra notes 53-58.
31. John Petrila, Paternalism and the Unrealized Promise of Essays in Therapeutic Jurispru-
dence, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 877, 881-82 (1993) (book review), reprinted in LAW IN A
THERAPEUTIC KEY, supra note 5, at 685. It is essential that therapeutic jurisprudence incorpo-
rate the viewpoints and perspectives of the eventual consumers of mental health services, both
those who voluntarily and those who involuntarily enter the mental health system. See Michael
L. Perlin, A Law of Healing, 68 U. CINN. L. REV. 407, 413-15 (2000). John Petrila, Paternalism
and the Unrealized Promise of Essays in Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS.
877, 881-82 (1993) (book review), reprinted in LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY, supra note 5, at
685.
32. Joel Haycock, Speaking Truth to Power: Rights, Therapeutic Jurisprudence, and Massa-
chusetts Mental Health Law, 20 N. ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 301, 317 (1994),
reprinted in LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY, supra note 5, at 669.
33. Wexler, supra note 19, at 762.
34. See Christopher Slobogin, Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Five Dilemmas to Ponder, 1
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 193 (1995), reprinted in LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY, supra note
5, at 763, 766, 772-83.
35. MICHAEL L. PERLIN, THE HIDDEN PREJUDICE: MENTAL DISABILITY ON TRIAL,
266-67 (2000). See also Michael L. Perlin, Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Understanding the Sanist
and Pretextual Bases of Mental Disability Law, 20 N. ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT
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The early TJ articles, as well as many of the precursors, focused
primarily on "typical" mental disability law questions.36 Subsequent
pieces applied TJ principles to issues somewhat more collateral (e.g.,
corrections37 and sexual battery 3 ). Later articles bridged the gap
between mental disability law and traditional legal inquiries (e.g., jury
service,39 contracts g° torts g4 and estate planning42). Perhaps a tad per-
369, 371-72 (1994); Michael L. Perlin, A Law of Healing, 68 U. GIN. L. REV. 407, 419-33
(2000); Michael L. Perlin, "Half-Wracked Prejudice Leaped Forth": Sanism, Pretextuality, and
Why and How Mental Disability Law Developed as It Did, 10 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 3
(1999).
Sanism is an irrational prejudice of the same quality and character of other irrational preju-
dices that cause, and are reflected in, prevailing social attitudes of racism, sexism, homophobia,
and ethnic bigotry. It infects our jurisprudence and our lawyering practices. It is largely socially
acceptable and largely unacknowledged. It affects judges, lawyers, expert witnesses, therapists,
hospital administrators, legislators, jurors, and the general public. When social science data
appear to rebut sanist myths, we simply ignore that data because it does not comport with our a
priori views. See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, On "Sanism", 46 SMU L. REV. 373 (1992) [hereinafter
Perlin, On Sanism]; Michael L. Perlin & Deborah A. Dorfman, Sanism, Social Science, and the
Development of Mental Disability Law Jurisprudence, 11 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 47 (1993).
The entire relationship between the legal process and mentally disabled individuals is often
pretextual. By this we mean that courts accept, either implicitly or explicitly, testimonial dishon-
esty and engage similarly in dishonest and frequently meretricious decision-making, specifically
where witnesses, especially expert witnesses, show a "high propensity to purposely distort their
testimony in order to achieve desired ends." Michael L. Perlin, Pretexts and Mental Disability
Law: The Case of Competency, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 625, 627 n.3 (1993). The pretexts of the
forensic mental health system are reflected both in the testimony of forensic experts and in the
decisions of legislators and fact-finders. Experts frequently testify in accordance with their own
self-referential concepts of morality and often openly subvert statutory and caselaw criteria. This
testimony is often further warped by a heuristic bias. Expert witnesses, like the rest of us, suc-
cumb to the meretricious allure of simplifying cognitive devices in their thinking, and employ
such heuristic gambits as the vividness effects or attribution theory in their testimony. See id.
36. For a comprehensive list, see 1 MICHAEL L. PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW:
CIVIL AND CRIMINAL § 2D-3, at 534-41 (2d ed. 1998).
37. See Fred Cohen & Joel Dvoskin, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Corrections: A Glimpse,
10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 777 (1993), excerpted in LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY, supra
note 5, at 149. See also T. Howard Stone, Therapeutic Implications of Incarceration for Persons
with Severe Mental Disorders: Searching for Rational Health Policy, 24 AM. J. GRIM. L. 283
(1997).
38. See Nathalie Des Rosiers et al., Legal Compensation for Sexual Violence: Therapeutic
Consequences and Consequences for the Judicial System, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 433 (1998);
Bruce Feldthusen, The Civil Action for Sexual Battery: Therapeutic Jurisprudence? 25 OTTAWA
L. REV. 205 (1993), reprinted in LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY, supra note 5, at 845.
39. See Daniel W. Shuman et al., The Health Effects of Jury Service, 18 LAW & PSYCHOL.
REV. 267 (1994), reprinted in LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY, supra note 5, at 949.
40. See Jeffrey L. Harrison, Class, Personality, Contract, and Unconscionability, 35 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 445 (1994), reprinted in LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY, supra note 5, at 525.
41. Daniel W. Shuman, The Psychology of Compensation in Tort Law, 43 U. KAN. L. REV.
39 (1994), reprinted in LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY, supra note 5, at 433.
42. Jennifer K. Robbenault & Monica Kirkpatrick Johnson, Legal Planning for Unmarried
Committed Partners, Empirical Lessons for a Preventive and Therapeutic Approach, 41 ARIZ. L.
REV. 417 (1999).
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versely, we, in a paper co-authored with Debbie Dorfman,43 an attor-
ney now working for the Washington State Office of Protection and
Advocacy, took this inquiry full circle by examining, inter alia, the
constitutional cases that are the "grandparents" of mental disability
law: O'Connor v. Donaldson,44 Wyatt v. Stickney,45 and Lessard v.
Schmidt.46 This examination was an effort to determine whether the
development of the bodies of law that these cases spawned-primarily,
the placement of constitutional limitations on the civil commitment
process and the right to treatment-has been therapeutic.
One of our specific focal points was the actual litigation strategy
of the lawyers representing patients in some of these cases. For years,
social critics-notably H. Richard Lamb, E. Fuller Torrey, Rael Isaac
and Virginia Armat-have scapegoated patients' rights lawyers as the
true villains in the development of mental disability law.47 A reexami-
nation of the key cases in question, specifically ones that these critics
list as the true bete noires,4s suggested that their analysis was simply
"dead wrong"49 and that the cases in question were greatly illuminated
by therapeutic jurisprudence.5"
This research led us again to step back and reflect on David
Wexler's initial premise, which he stated when he edited the 1990
book of essays, Law as a Therapeutic Agent: that every aspect of the
legal system has a TJ potential-not simply judicial decisions, legisla-
tive enactments, and administrative regulations, but "lawyers' roles"
as well. In the introduction to this collection, Wexler honed in on two
separate issues:
43. Michael L. Perlin et al., Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Civil Rights of Institution-
alized Mentally Disabled Persons: Hopeless Oxymoron or Path to Redemption?, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB.
POL'Y & L. 80 (1995), excerpted in LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY, supra note 5, at 739.
44. 422 U.S. 563 (1975) (constitutional right to liberty).
45. 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971), affid sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305
(5th Cir. 1974) (constitutional right to liberty).
46. 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated and remanded, 414 U.S. 473, and on
remand, 379 F. Supp. 1376 (E.D. Wis. 1974), vacated and remanded, 421 U.S. 957 (1975), and
reinstated, 413 F. Supp. 1318 (E.D. Wis. 1976) (application of substantive and procedural due
process at involuntary civil commitment hearing).
47. See, e.g., RAEL JEAN ISAAC & VIRGINIA C. ARMAT, MADNESS IN THE STREETS:
How PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW ABANDONED THE MENTALLY ILL 107-60 (1990); E. FUL-
LER TORREY, NOWHERE TO GO: THE TRAGIC ODYSSEY OF THE HOMELESS MENTALLY ILL
156-60 (1988); H. Richard Lamb, Deinstitutionalization and the Homeless Mentally Ill, 35 HOSP.
& COMMUN. PSYCHIATRY 899,902 (1984).
48. See Keri A. Gould, "Madness in the Streets" Rides the Wave of Sanism, 9 N.Y.L. SCH. J.
HUM. RTS. 567 (1992) (reviewing ISAAC & ARMAT, supra note 46); Michael L. Perlin, Compe-
tency, Deinstitutionalization, and Homelessness: A Story of Marginalization, 28 HOUS. L. REV.
63, 87-88 (1991) (discussing Torrey's criticisms of Lessard, O'Connor, and Wyatt).
49. Michael L. Perlin, Law and the Delivery of Mental Health Services in the Community, 64
AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 194,202-03 (1994).
50. See Perlin et al., supra note 43, at 740-41.
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Apart from specific substantive rules of law, the legal system
itself--especially the legal apparatus used to litigate questions of
committability and the like-should be examined, and perhaps
restructured, to maximize its therapeutic aspects and to mini-
mize its antitherapeutic aspects. 
51
A final aspect of therapeutic jurisprudence to be discussed here
is the examination of and eventual tinkering with the roles and
behavior of judges and attorneys so that those persons may per-
form in a fashion that meshes with professional ethics and yet is
therapeutically beneficial.5 2
We concur with Slobogin's suggested definitional adoption of
therapeutic (for purposes of therapeutic jurisprudence) as meaning
"beneficial in the sense of improving the psychological or physical
well-being of a person." 3 Under this definition, TJ may be seen as
"the use of social science to study the extent to which a legal rule or prac-
tice promotes the psychological and physical well-being of the people it
affects. )154
Interestingly and surprisingly, little attention has been paid to
the question of the psychological effect of the attorney's role on the
client, the attorney him or herself, or the legal process as a whole. 5 In
Wexler's first book, he included excerpts from some of the most
important work that had then been done, especially a Yale Law Journal
student note on counsel's role in the involuntary civil commitment
process56 and John J. Ensminger and Thomas D. Liguori's break-
51. David B. Wexler, An Introduction to Therapeutic Jurisprudence, in THERAPEUTIC
JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 18, at 3, 14; David Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Cul-
ture of Critique, 10 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 263, 267 (1999) (bringing an explicit culture of
care into law practice will better serve clients, harmonize law practice for clients and lawyers,
contribute to satisfaction and decrease lawyer distress, and begin to attract those in the legal
profession who opted out of practicing in the culture of critique).
52. Id. at 16.
53. Slobogin, supra note 34, at 767. See also Christopher Slobogin & Mark Fondacaro,
Rethinking Deprivations or Liberty: Possible Contributions from Therapeutic and Ecological Juris-
prudence, 18 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 499 (2000).
54. Id. Cf. Eric Y. Drogin, From Therapeutic Jurisprudence... to Jurisprudent Theory, 18
BEHAV. SCI. & L. 489 (2000) (analyzing mental health science, practice, and roles in terms of
their "jurisprudent," neutral, or "antijurisprudent" effects).
55. Professor Philip Schrag notes that in constructing a clinic, the clinician should consider
the role of emotions in a student's transition from the role of student to the role of an attorney.
Philip G. Schrag, Constructing a Clinic, 3 CLINICAL L. REV. 175, 182 (1996).
By far the most important recent work is that of Susan Daicoff. See, e.g., Susan Daicoff, Ask-
ing Leopards to Change Their Spots: Should Lawyers Change? A Critique of Solutions to Problems
with Professionalism by Reference to Empirically-Derived Attorney Personality Attributes, 11 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 547 (1998). See generally SUSAN DAICOFF, LAWYER, KNOW THYSELF (Amer-
ican Psychological Ass'n, forthcoming 2001).
56. Steven J. Goode, Note, The Role of Counsel in the Civil Commitment Process: A Theoret-
[Vol. 24:339
2000] Clinical Teaching
through article on the therapeutic potential of that process.5 7 Since
then, only a few consciously therapeutic jurisprudence articles have
been written in this field,5" including two by KKG (a therapeutic
analysis of competency requests and the use of TJ to evaluate certain
provisions in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines),59 one by Janet
Abisch (on mediational lawyering in the civil commitment context),60
one by Professor Jan Costello (on how counsel's role is perceived by
the various participants in the system),61 another by Professor Robert
Schopp (on balancing client autonomy and therapeutic considera-
tion)," and one by Professor David Wexler (on teaching therapeutic
ical Framework, 84 YALE L.J. 1540 (1975), excerpted in THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE, supra
note 18, at 309.
57. John J. Ensminger & Thomas D. Liguori, The Therapeutic Significance of the Civil
Commitment Hearing: An Unexplored Potential, 6 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 5 (1978), excerpted in
THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 18, at 245. Other relevant excerpts published in
THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE include: Marc Amaya & W.V. Burlingame, Judicial Review of
Psychiatric Admissions: The Clinical Impact on Child and Adolescent Inpatients, 20 J. AM. ACAD.
CHILD & ADOLESC. PSYCHIATRY 761, 281 (1981); Paul Appelbaum, Paternalism and the Role of
the Mental Health Lawyer, 34 HOSP. & COMMUN. PSYCHIATRY 211, 325 (1983); and Michael
L. Perlin, An Invitation to the Dance: An Empirical Response to Chief Justice Warren Burger's
"Time-Consuming Procedural Minuets" Theory in Parham v. J.R., 9 AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY &
L. 149, 291 (1981).
58. The most important recent inquiry is Bruce J. Winick, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and
the Civil Commitment Hearing, 10 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 37 (1999). "Not only must the
legal rules governing the civil commitment hearing seek to accomplish [Therapeutic Jurispru-
dence] values, but lawyers, judges, and clinicians should learn how to play their roles so as to
apply the law therapeutically and not antitherapeutically." Id. at 60. See also Tom R. Tyler, The
Psychological Consequences of Judicial Procedures: Implications for Civil Commitment Hearings, 46
SMU L. REV. 433 (1992).
One of us (MLP) alludes to this question elsewhere. See Michael L. Perlin, Fatal Assump-
tion: A Critical Evaluation of the Role of Counsel in Mental Disability Cases, 16 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 39, 57-58 (1992) ("Finally, the recent interest demonstrated by scholars in 'therapeutic
jurisprudence' should force all participants in the system to begin to critically weigh the thera-
peutic (or antitherapeutic) effect of the mental disability system. Here, adequate counsel is
needed to ensure consideration of the therapeutic potential inherent in mental disability litiga-
tion.").
59. Keri A. Gould, A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Analysis of Competency Evaluation Requests:
The Defense Attorney's Dilemma, 18 INT'L. J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 83 (1995) [hereinafter Gould,
Attorney's Dilemma]; Keri A. Gould, Turning Rat and Doing Time for Uncharged, Dismissed, or
Acquitted Crimes: Do the Federal Sentencing Guidelines Promote Respect for the Law?, 10 N.Y.L.
SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 835 (1993) [hereinafter Gould, Sentencing Guidelines] reprinted in LAW IN A
THERAPEUTIC KEY, supra note 5, at 171.
60. Janet B. Abisch, Mediational Lawyering in the Civil Commitment Context: A Therapeutic
Jurisprudence Solution to the Counsel Role Dilemma, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 120 (1995).
61. Jan Costello, "Why Would I Need a Lawyer?" Legal Counsel and Advocacy for People
with Mental Disabilities, in LAW, MENTAL HEALTH, AND MENTAL DISORDER, supra note 26,
at 15.
62. Robert F. Schopp, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Conflicts Among Values in Mental
Health Law, 11 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 31 (1993), reprinted in LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY, supra
note 5, at 723.
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jurisprudence).63  Professor James Holstein's excellent (but still
generally undiscovered by the world of law professors)64 sociologi-
cally-grounded work, Court-Ordered Insanity: Interpretive Practice
and Involuntary Commitment,65 provides much food for thought from a
TJ perspective, but does not make any reference to this school of
thought. More recently, TJ has been connected to preventive law with
an eye toward explicitly applying the law therapeutically rather than
seeking to reform the law. Dennis Stolle and David Wexler have
suggested that periodic "legal checkups" can provide lawyers with an
ongoing opportunity to counsel clients "about ways in which the law
may be applied or invoked in a sensitive and therapeutic manner.61
III. CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION: THE NEW WAVE
The interest in and expansion of TJ literature has coincided with
a similar explosion in clinical legal scholarship.67 Over the past
decade, clinical education has climbed many steps in asserting its right
to come up out of the basement and into mainstream law school offer-
ings.68 In doing so, clinical law teachers have been at the forefront of
63. Wexler, supra note 8.
64. But see Susan Stefan, Silencing the Different Voice: Competence, Feminist Theory and
Law, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 763, 778 & n.80 (1993) (citing to James A. Holstein, Court Ordered
Incompetence: Conversational Organization in Involuntary Commitment Hearings, 35 SOC. PROB-
LEMS 458, 459 (1988)).
65. JAMES A. HOLSTEIN, COURT-ORDERED INSANITY: INTERPRETIVE PRACTICE AND
INVOLUNTARY COMMITMENT (1993).
66. Stolle & Wexler, supra note 8; PRACTICING TJ, supra note 18. See also Marc W. Patry
et al., Better Legal Counseling Through Empirical Research: Identifying Psycholegal Soft Spots and
Strategies, 34 CAL. W.L. REV. 439 (1998); David B. Wexler, The Development of Therapeutic
Jurisprudence: From Theory to Practice, 68 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 691 (1999).
67. Not unsurprisingly, a similar trend has been noted between the developmental stages of
feminist pedagogy and clinical legal education. Phyllis Goldfarb, A Theory-Practice Spiral: The
Ethics of Feminism and Clinical Education, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1599, 1618 n.75 (1991) (noting that
Professors Mark Tushnet and Carrie Menkel-Meadow have commented on the similarities
between feminism and clinical education without focusing on the relationship between feminist
theory and clinical legal education.); Linda Morton, Creating a Classroom Component for Field
Placement Programs: Enhancing Clinical Goals with Feminist Pedagogy, 45 ME. L. REV. 19, 38-39
(1993).
68. McDiarmid, supra note 15, at 266-68 (discussing the belief of many law school
clinicians that they are relegated to second class status within the law school faculty). In essence,
the university law school has constrained clinical education from the core curriculum by
marginalizing clinics in terms of space, budget allocations, prestige, and conceptualizations and
by infiltrating clinical programs with the traditional techniques of the university law school.
Phillip C. Kissam, Lurching Toward the Millennium: The Law School, the Research University,
and the Professional Reforms of Legal Education, 60 OHIO ST. L. J. 1965, 1994 (1999).
Not that the fight for equality is over. Clinical education still remains marginalized in the
law school curriculum despite the recommendations of the MacCrate Report and the AALS and
ABA regulations. It is often asserted that instructional costs are the greatest barrier to expanding
clinical education within the law school curriculum. While a clinical course may require the
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invigorating clinical scholarship69 through the investigation of adult
learning styles,7" clinical teaching methodology,71 and theories of law-
yering and legal practice.12  An important aspect of this research has
been the recognition of the narrative voice within the context of
multiple jurisprudential viewpoints, including feminist jurispru-
dence,73  critical race theory,74  law and literature, 75  ethnographic
commitment of resources beyond those required for a traditional class, see David F. Chavkin,
Training the Ed Sparers of Tomorrow: Integrating Health Law Theory and Practice, 60 BROOK. L.
REV. 303, 333 (1994), commentators suggest that the cost debate should be shifted and
broadened to address the reallocation of resources to implement curriculum reform. See Beverly
Balos, Conferring on the MacCrate Report: A Clinical Gaze, 1 CLINICAL L. REV. 349, 352-54
(1994). "[T]he focus on cost places teachers concerned with professional skills in a defensive
posture. It permits the issue to be framed around a construct that inherently marginalizes the
skills and values that the MacCrate Task Force concluded were vital to becoming a responsible,
caring, and competent lawyer." Id. at 354.
69. See, e.g., Robert D. Dinerstein, Clinical Scholarship and the Justice Mission, 40 CLEV.
L. REV. 469 (1992); Mary J. Eyster, Designing and Teaching the Large Externship Clinic, 5 CLINI-
CAL L. REV. 347 (1999); Peter Toll Hoffman, Clinical Scholarship and Skills Training, 1 CLIN-
ICAL L. REV. 93 (1994); Peter A. Joy, Clinical Scholarship: Improving the Practice of Law, 2
CLINICAL L. REV. 385 (1996); Harriet 0. Katz, Using Faculty Tutorials to Foster Externship Stu-
dents' Critical Reflection, 5 CLINICAL L. REV. 437 (1999); Peter Morgulies, Re-framing Empathy
in Clinical Legal Education, 5 CLINICAL L. REV. 605 (1999); Gary Palm, Reconceptualizing Clini-
cal Scholarship as Clinical Instruction, 1 CLINICAL L. REV. 127 (1994).
70. See, e.g., Liz Ryan Cole, Training the Mentor: Improving the Ability of Legal Experts to
Teach Students and New Lawyers, 19 N.M. L. REV. 163 (1989); Jennifer P. Lyman, Getting Per-
sonal in Supervision: Looking for That Fine Line, 2 CLINICAL L. REV. 211 (1995); Linda Morton
et al., Not Quite Grown Up: The Difficulty of Applying an Adult Education Model to Legal Externs,
5 CLINICAL L. REV. 469 (1999); Don Peters & Martha M. Peters, Maybe That's Why I Do That:
Psychological Type Theory, the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator, and Learning Legal Interviewing, 35
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 169 (1990) (exploring the value of using the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator
to predict interviewing skills and styles); Fran Quigley, Seizing the Disorienting Moment: Adult
Learning Theory and the Teaching of Social Justice in Law School Clinics, 2 CLINICAL L. REV. 37
(1995).
71. Gary L. Blasi, What Lawyers Know: Lawyering Expertise, Cognitive Science, and the
Functions of Theory, 45 J. LEGAL EDUC. 313 (1995); Howard Lesnick, Being a Teacher, of Law-
yers: Discerning the Theory of My Practice, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1095 (1992); James E. Moliterno,
In-House Live Client Clinical Programs: Some Ethical Issues, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2377 (1999);
William P. Quigley, Introduction to Clinical Teaching for the New Clinical Law Professor: A View
from the First Floor, 28 AKRON L. REV. 463 (1995); Mary Marsh Zulack, Rediscovering Client
Decisionmaking: The Impact of Role Playing, 1 CLINICAL L. REV. 593 (1995).
72. See, e.g., Kimberlee K. Kovach, The Lawyer as Teacher: The Role of Education in Law-
yering, 4 CLINICAL L. REV. 359 (1998); Richard D. Marsico, Working for Social Change and Pre-
serving Client Autonomy: Is There a Role for "Facilitative" Lawyering?, 1 CLINICAL L. REV. 639
(1995); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Legacy of Clinical Education: Theories About Lawyering, 29
CLEV. ST. L.J. 555 (1980); Catherine O'Grady, Clinical Education, Collaborative Pedagogy and
the Realities of Practice for the New Lawyer, 4 CLINICAL L. REV. 485 (1998).
73. See, e.g., Goldfarb, supra note 67; Minna J. Kotkin, Creating True Believers: Putting
Macro Theory into Practice, 5 CLINICAL L. REV. 95 (1998).
74. Margaret M. Russell, Entering Great America: Reflections on Race and the Convergence
of Progressive Legal Theory and Practice, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 749 (1992).
Clinical Education [provides a level of understanding of the relationship between law
and justice] by facilitating transformative experiential opportunities for exploring the
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theory,76 ecological learning theory,7 7 and case theory.7" At least one
commentator has linked all of the theoretical views, with the exception
of case theory, under the rubric of critical lawyering.7 9 Critical lawyer-
ing also focuses on the application of these movements as practice
formulations focusing on constructing legal theories grounded by the
stories of the pluralist perspectives of subordinated peoples.8"
Whatever theoretical perspective we as law professors bring to
the clinical classroom, most of us, if not all of us, incorporate a client-
centered approach to the practice of lawyering.8s Client-centered law-
yering seeks to empower clients8 2 to make important decisions at each
step of the legal process. It encourages an egalitarian relationship
between lawyer and client, or at least a relationship that is more egali-
tarian than is found within the traditional power structure of a pater-
nalistic attorney-client relationship. 3 Lawyers and clients are urged to
meaning of justice and developing a personal sense of justice through exposure to the
impact of the legal system on subordinated persons and groups and through the
deconstruction of power and privilege in the law.
Dubin, supra note 11, at 1477.
75. See, e.g., James Boyd White, Law and Literature: "No Manifesto," 39 MERCER L.
REV. 739 (1988); Nancy L. Cook, Outside the Tradition: Literature as Legal Scholarship, 63 U.
CIN. L. REV. 95 (1994); Teree E. Foster, But Is It Law? Using Literature to Penetrate Societal
Representations of Women, 43 J. LEGAL EDUC. 133 (1993).
76. See, e.g., Gay Gellhorn et al., Law and Language: An Interdisciplinary Study of Client
Interviews, 1 CLINICAL L. REV. 245 (1994). We are prompted by ethnography to examine those
behaviors that we take for granted and to rethink our basic values and assumptions by standing
outside ourselves and looking at beliefs and behaviors in new ways. Id. at 251. The ethno-
graphic research model is dialectic, not linear, and it offers a social science metaphor within
which the richness and variety of group life can be expressed as it is learned from direct involve-
ment with the group itself. Id. at 251 n.12.
77. See, e.g., Brook K. Baker, Beyond MacCrate: The Role of Context, Experience, Theory,
and Reflection in Ecological Learning, 36 ARIZ. L. REV. 287 (1994).
78. See, e.g., Binny Miller, Give Them Back Their Lives: Recognizing Client Narrative in
Case Theory, 93 MICH. L. REV. 485 (1994).
79. Id. at 486-87.
80. Phyllis Goldfarb, A Clinic Runs Through It, 1 CLINICAL L. REV. 65, 65 (1994).
81. See generally DAVID A. BINDER ET AL., LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS: A CLIENT-
CENTERED APPROACH (1991); Robert D. Dinerstein, Client-Centered Counseling: Reappraisal
and Refinement, 32 ARIZ. L. REV. 501 (1990); Stephen Ellmann, Client-Centeredness Multiplied:
Individual Autonomy and Collective Mobilization in Public Interest Lawyers' Representation of
Groups, 78 VA. L. REV. 1103 (1992). For a critique of client-centeredness lawyering, see Paul R.
Tremblay, A Tragic View of Poverty Law Practice, 1 D.C. L. REV. 123 (1992).
82. Jennifer Howard, a law student writing about her clinical experience in Learning to
"Think Like a Lawyer" Through Experience, 2 CLINICAL L. REV. 167 (1995), wrote that one of
the most important lessons she learned in the clinic was that lawyers empower, not save. Id. at
189.
83. While clinicians have been somewhat successful in challenging the previously accepted
norms of power imbalance within the professional relationship, clinical practitioners express
great variability in opinion as to the appropriate degree of egalitarianism to be encouraged within
the professional relationship. See Stephen Ellmann, Empathy and Approval, 43 HASTINGS L.J.
991, 1001-02 (1992) (supporting the belief that lawyers should intervene to express their moral
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consider legal alternatives and to weigh the advantages and disadvan-
tages of various options in a supportive relationship that stresses the
autonomous decision-making capabilities of the client. At each deci-
sional juncture, critical theorists view both lawyers and clients as the
tellers of stories or narratives. Giving voice to the subordinated or
disenfranchised client is seen as an important, and perhaps even domi-
nant, goal of lawyering. 4 Contextual narrative inculcates the clinical
theorist in the identification and redefinition of the allocation of power
within the legal context.8" Case theory, as differentiated from a
particular jurisprudential perspective, contemplates even greater
encouragement of storytelling by and about clients within the legal
process.86 Case theory has an individualized empowerment focus
rather than a group-based analysis of the allocation of power. Case
theory acts as a litigation theory that empowers clients by allowing
them to choose silence or a lawyer's narrative over the client's own to
improve their chances of winning or achieving some other goal."
Therapeutic jurisprudence allows us to examine the dynamics of
the legal encounter in a different way. Therapeutic jurisprudence
focuses on the law's impact on emotional life.8  Using TJ, the lawyer
seeks to become aware of the ways the law or legal procedure might be
most therapeutically applied,89 thereby producing the greatest sense of
well-being for the client. This, however, only begins the inquiry.
Next, the lawyer must determine the legal efficacy and consequences
of the therapeutic outcome. Therapeutic jurisprudence also incorpo-
rates the use of social science data as empirical evidence to support the
perception of therapeutic or counter-therapeutic voice within the legal
system. Therapeutic jurisprudence seeks to inform lawyering prac-
tices9" and influence policy91 by using social science data and method-
perspective); Peter Margulies, Access, Connection, and Voice: A Contextual Approach to Repre-
senting Senior Citizens of Questionable Capacity, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 1073, 1085-90 (1994)
(arguing that when representing challenged seniors, client-centeredness must be influenced by
the client's variability of state of mind, her ability to understand consequences, the irreversibility
of the decision, the substantive fairness of the transaction, and the consistency of lifetime com-
mitments); Schopp, supra note 62 (explicitly constructing a framework for balancing client
autonomy and therapeutic considerations).
84. See GERALD P. LOPEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING: ONE CHICANO'S VISION OF
PROGRESSIVE LAW PRACTICE (1992); Anthony V. Alfieri, The Antinomies of Poverty Law and a
Theory of Dialogic Empowerment, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 659 (1987); Angelo N.
Ancheta, Community Lawyering, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1363 (1993) (reviewing LOPEZ, supra).
85. See Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice: Learning Lessons of Client
Narrative, 100 YALE L.J. 2107 (1991).
86. Miller, supra note 78, at 524-25.
87. Id. at 525.
88. Stolle & Wexler, supra note 8.
89. See Wexler, Applying the Law Therapeutically, supra note 18.
90. See, e.g., Gould, Attorney's Dilemma, supra note 59; Dennis P. Stolle, Professional
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ology to study the extent to which a legal rule, procedure, or practice
promotes the psychological and physical well-being of the people it
affects.92 This unique perspective distinguishes TJ from the other
jurisprudential theories whose central focus may be the recognition of
power inequality for a specific group rather than therapeutic results
per se.93
Our thesis is that using TJ in clinical teaching creates in students
an affinity for engaging in multidisciplinary investigation and evaluat-
ing the therapeutic effects of the lawyering process or the case disposi-
tion.94 When examining the clinical education setting, the therapeutic
focus may be on the client, the clinical student, the clinical professor,
the supervising lawyer (who may also be the professor), or some other
"player" within the legal system.
As a scholarly matter, we find it useful to use therapeutic juris-
prudence as a framework within which to investigate and reformulate
areas of law reform aimed at resolving difficult societal dilemmas.9"
As a practical legal tool, we believe that TJ has far-reaching potential
in its application to teaching and conceptualizing lawyering skills, pro-
Responsibility in Elder Law: A Synthesis of Preventive Law and Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 14
BEHAV. SCI. & L. 459 (1996); David B. Wexler, Practicing Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Psycho-
legal Soft Spots and Strategies, 67 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 317 (1998).
91. See, e.g., Gould, Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 59; Jeffrey A. Klotz, Sex Offenders
and the Law: New Directions, in MENTAL HEALTH AND LAW: RESEARCH, POLICY AND SER-
VICES, 257 (Bruce D. Sales & Saleem A. Shah eds., 1996) excerpted in LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC
KEY, supra note 5, at 131; Kay Kavanagh, Don't Ask, Don't Tell: Deception Required, Disclosure
Denied, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 142 (1995) reprinted in LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY,
supra note 5, at 343; Bruce J. Winick, The Side Effects of Incompetency Labeling and the Implica-
tions for Mental Health Law, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 6 (1995) reprinted in LAW IN A
THERAPEUTIC KEY, supra note 5, at 17.
92. Slobogin, supra note 34, at 767.
93. Id. at 771. Therapeutic jurisprudence may also lend dignity to the voice of persons
subordinated even by those who profess to represent the powerless. Professor Rogelio Lasso, in
an article published by the Society of American Law Teachers (SALT), and in response to a
paper by MLP presented at a SALT conference on diversity, wrote in his review of the con-
ference that he found it particularly disturbing that "Sane-ism" merited a plenary presentation
but the "disgraceful lack of racial diversity of law school faculties" did not. Rogelio Lasso,
Diversity Is As Diversity Does, THE SALT EQUALIZER, Dec. 1994, at 18-19.
94. See generally Ensminger & Liguori, supra note 57.
95. See, e.g., Rose A. Daly-Rooney, Designing Reasonable Accommodations Through Co-
Worker Participation: Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Confdtentiality Provision of the Americans
with Disabilities Act, 8 J.L.& HEALTH 89 (1993) reprinted in LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY,
supra note 5, at 365; Richard P. Wiebe, The Mental Health Implications of Crime Victim's Rights,
in LAW, MENTAL HEALTH, AND MENTAL DISORDER (Bruce D. Sales & Daniel Shuman eds.,
1996) reprinted in LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY, supra note 5, at 213; David B. Wexler, Some
Therapeutic Jurisprudence Implications of the Outpatient Civil Commitment of Pregnant Substance
Abusers, 15 POL. & LIFE SCI. 73 (1996) reprinted in LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY, supra note 5,
at 145. For a discussion of the issue of lawyers as problem solvers, see Janet Reno, Lawyers as
Problem-Solvers: Keynote Address to the AALS, 49J. LEGAL ED. 5,5 (1999).
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fessional and supervisory relationships, ethical concerns, case strategy,
systemic and institutional critique, and student performance.
IV. THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE AND CLINICAL TEACHING
How may therapeutic jurisprudence enrich clinical teaching?
Our initial overview suggests at least four applications. Therapeutic
jurisprudence (1) improves our teaching of skills, (2) gives us a better
understanding of the dynamics of clinical relationships, (3) investi-
gates ethical concerns and the effect on lawyering roles, and (4) invig-
orates the way we as teachers and students question accepted legal
practice.
First, the learning of skills, whether through a strictly Binder &
Price-ian "client-centered" focus, a Lopez-White-Alfieri-filtered
"theoretics of practice," or an Ellmannesque emphasis on empathy, is
a natural laboratory for TJ inquiries. Our years of supervising clinical
and externship students have shown us that students "get" clinical
skills at very different levels of understanding. Some students appear
born to it; some learn, absorb, and eventually make these skills part of
their "lawyering unconsciousness"; some learn enough to spout the
right words and express the right emotions (while internally having
none of it); and others resist the entire enterprise.
We have often discussed why this is. We have variously attrib-
uted it to varying levels of moral development, parenting styles, where
students grew up, whether they had successful therapy experiences,
their selection of undergraduate majors, and whether they are "like
us."96 This may just be meaningless rumination, or it may simply
demonstrate that we take seriously the notions of transference and
countertransference in clinical settings.97 The underlying factual
basis, however, is undeniably real: different students process learning
skills in very different ways. Therapeutic jurisprudence can help us
understand why that is: why some may be unable to learn these skills,
96. Although we have a ten-year span in our ages, a gender difference, a difference in com-
munity of origins (one of us grew up in the suburbs and the other in an urban area), and different
college majors, we have felt an experiential mutuality since the first time we met and we have had
very similar career paths.
97. See Odeana R. Neal, Transference and Countertransference in the Clinical Supervisory
Experience, preliminary draft presented at the Clinical Theory Workshop, New York Law School
(1995) (urging clinical faculty to examine the supervisory process and to make their relationship
with their students a part of the learning process) (on file with author); Kathleen A. Sullivan,
Self-Disclosure, Separation, and Students: Intimacy in the Clinical Relationship, 27 IND. L. REV.
115 (1993) (discussing the level of intimacy inherent in the clinical supervisory relationship).
For a thoughtful new approach to this issue, see Marjorie A. Silver, Love, Hate, and Other
Emotional Interference in the Lawyer/Client Relationship, 6 CLINICAL L. REV. 259 (1999).
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and why some may require different approaches.9" It can also inform
us about the efficacy of our teaching and can highlight the extent to
which we tend to reinforce, through grades and other kinds of feed-
back, those students whose skill learning comfort zone is like ours, and
how we react to the detriment of those students whose zone is quite
different from ours.
In relation to the teaching of skills, as we will explain later in this
Article, TJ can give students a framework for interviewing a client or
planning a counseling session. Therapeutic jurisprudence insights
may suggest to students how to focus empathy, frame questions, and
probe client responses.
Second, therapeutic jurisprudence can be a powerful tool for
understanding the various interpersonal dynamics inherent in clinical
relationships: student-client, student-student, student-professor, stu-
dent-significant other, 99 and student-predecessor/successor student.
In a superb article,"° Naomi Cahn and Norman Schneider, take an
extended psychodynamic look at the latter issue, and provide a blue-
print for further investigations in this area. Furthermore, TJ allows us
to speculate about the therapeutic and antitherapeutic content of all
these relationships, the impact of that content on the job we do as pro-
fessors and as lawyers, and also the quality of growth and performance
by our students.
Therapeutic jurisprudence gives us the tools to recognize and
problem-solve issues of stress that can inhibit clinical law students-
potentially becoming habitual as young lawyers continue in the pro-
fession. Being a lawyer is stressful. Being a law student is very
stressful. Being a clinical professor is stressful. 1' Representing our
"clientele" is stressful. No doubt, being a client of a law school clinic
is stressful. The clinic, simply, can be a stressful place or, at best, a
place filled with stressed people.)°2
98. See Liz Ryan Cole, Lessons from a Semester in Practice, 1 CLINICAL L. REV. 173
(1994); Fran Quigley, Seizing the Disorienting Moment: Adult Learning Theory and the Teaching
of Social Justice in Law School Clinics, 2 CLINICAL L. REV. 37 (1995).
99. We are both reminded of students who came to us distraught over the impact the clinic
was having on their spousal relationships. One student said that her husband threatened to leave
her if she continued to work with "those people," and another decried another clinical professor's
exhortation that when you are working on a case, everything, including your spouse and children,
must take second place.
100. Naomi R. Cahn & Norman G. Schneider, The Next Best Thing: Transferred Clients in
a Legal Clinic, 36 CATH. U. L. REV. 367 (1986).
101. Because we both are now teaching clinical externship courses, our role is probably less
stressful than that of a clinical professor with the primary responsibility for on-going cases.
102. We also believe that these roles become more stressful each year for a variety of
reasons: student uncertainty about the job market, which makes the choice of electing a nonbar,
non-"business success" -oriented course a more difficult and problematic one to many; the
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Ann Juergens' list of factors that can influence client cases-
"[c]riminal matters, medical conditions, working conditions, commu-
nity conditions, race, cultural traditions, gender, poverty, youth or
age, mental illness, alcoholism, abuse, illiteracy and underlying anger
or depression'l°3--is simultaneously a list of stressors in contemporary
urban society. The student thrust into a clinical setting without much
warning or preparation is forced to confront difficult, complex, and
often contradictory feelings about what he or she is doing and how he
or she is doing it. Each student comes to the clinic with his or her own
"ordinary common sense,' '104 comprised of "a 'prereflective attitude'
exemplified by the attitude of 'What I know is "self-evident"; it is
"what everybody knows."'0 5 The anxiety that is often spawned by the
first student-client contact can flow to other students, to the signifi-
cant others in the students' lives, to the professor and, of course, to the
client.
We can safely say that most students do not initially enter the
clinic seminar room having assimilated all of Stephen Ellmann's and
Carrie Menkel-Meadow's work on empathy, 1°6 or Anthony Alfieri's
pieces on postmodernism and clinical legal education.0 7 We are ask-
increasingly conservative tone of the electorate and the judiciary; additional pressures on
nontenured clinical teachers to do scholarship that approximates that of nonclinicians (as part of
the tenuring or long-term contracting process) and to continually "justify their existence" to
often-hostile colleagues.
A plethora of articles have commented on the stressfulness of the law school experience as
well as the clinical experience. See, e.g., Susan Daicoff, Making Law Therapeutic for Lawyers:
Therapeutic Jurisprudence, Preventive Law, and the Psychology of Lawyers, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB.
POL'Y & L. 811, 817 (1999); Elwork & Benjamin, supra note 5; Lani Guinier et al., Becoming
Gentlemen: Women's Experiences at One Ivy League Law School, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1994)
(feminist perspective); Howard, supra note 82 (from the perspective of a clinical law student);
Marjorie A. Silver, Emotional Intelligence and Legal Education, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L.
1173, 1182 (1999). These observations are not all new. See Andrew S. Watson, The Quest for
Professional Competence: Psychological Aspects of Legal Education, 37 U. CIN. L. REV. 91 (1968).
103. Ann Juergens, Teach Your Students Well: Valuing Clients in the Law School Clinic, 2
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POLY 339, 355 (1993).
104. See generally Bill Ong Hing, Raising Personal Identification Issues of Class, Race, Eth-
nicity, Gender, Sexual Orientation, Physical Disability, and Age in Lawyering Courses, 45 STAN. L.
REV. 1807, 1810 (1993) ("Common sense, without training, is dangerously fashioned by our own
class, race, ethnicity/culture, gender, and sexual background."); Michael L. Perlin, Psychody-
namics and the Insanity Defense: "Ordinary Common Sense" and Heuristic Reasoning, 69 NEB. L.
REV. 3 (1990).
105. Richard K. Sherwin, Dialects and Dominance: A Study of Rhetorical Fields in the Law
of Confessions, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 729, 737 (1988). See Perlin, On "Sanism", supra note 35, at
380 n.46.
106. Stephen Ellmann, supra note 83; Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Narrowing the Gap by Nar-
rowing the Field: What's Missing from the MacCrate Report--Of Skills, Legal Science and Being a
Human Being, 69 WASH. L. REV. 593 (1994).
107. See, e.g., Anthony V. Alfieri, Disabled Clients, Disabling Lawyers, 43 HASTINGS L.J.
769 (1992).
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ing our students not to simply learn about the law, interviewing, and
lawyering, but also to absorb vast bodies of legal theory generally
unknown to 90% or more of the practicing bar. We are deluding
ourselves if we fail to recognize the stress that this can beget.
One of the few essays to explicitly address these issues is, inter-
estingly, one from an earlier generation of clinical literature, an article
by Kenneth Kreiling on clinical education and lawyer competency.10
8
Kreiling notes that clinical education "thrusts students into situations
where they not only must learn substantive and procedural law, but
also must understand lawyering tasks and the system within which
lawyers operate, confront issues of professional responsibility, inte-
grate [this] knowledge, and take action."'0 9 The "very depth of the
involvement and the newness of the role make the experience poten-
tially debilitating," he warns, adding that the "gaps between knowl-
edge and skill, on the one hand, and role demands, on the other,
contribute to a high level of anxiety in most students."" 0  Because of
this, he adds a specific warning to clinical supervisors: "Unless the
supervisor appreciates the possibility for debilitating anxiety and pro-
perly structures the clinical experience, both to avoid overtaxing the
student's integrative capacity and to facilitate the learning process, the
enormous potential of the experience will not be realized.' The TJ
potential in Kreiling's essay is limitless.
Third, TJ can be of great value in how we weigh the multiple
ethical issues we face in clinical education. These issues are inextri-
cably intertwined with subissues of power, of class, of race, and of
gender. Therapeutic jurisprudence allows us (perhaps, forces us) to
take a hard look at the impact of these issues on our students' well-
being in their roles as clinical participants. We do not believe we can,
or should try, to eviscerate all of our students' preexisting "-isms" in
one 14-week semester. On the other hand, we have to acknowledge
them, let the students know we are acknowledging them, and work
through with the students how these "-isms" are affecting their clin-
ical roles. Again, therapeutic jurisprudence can be a great aid in this
venture.
Profound experiential learning takes place in clinical courses. It
is fed by student recognition that clinical clients will likely have far
more personal experience with "extreme poverty, illiteracy, hunger,
108. Kenneth Kreiling, Clinical Education and Lawyer Competency: The Process of Learning
to Learn from Experience Through Properly Structured Clinical Supervision, 40 MD. L. REV. 284
(1981).
109. Id. at 287.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 288.
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homelessness, mental illness, the dehumanization of minimum wage
jobs or the welfare office" than will clinical students.'12  Clinics
represent "outsiders, poor or otherwise disadvantaged people who are
subordinated within the culture." ' As these are by and large individ-
uals without access to the legal world that is the focus of most of legal
education, clinics thus create an opportunity for students to obtain
alternative understandings of clients' lives and experiences.14 Con-
sciousness and sensitivity to class, race, and other social variables in a
clinical setting can contribute to good lawyering."' Representing "real
clients" in clinics presents "profound moral implications" for every
person in a clinical setting who assumes that responsibility.
V. THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE IN THE CLINIC
A. As a Paradigm for Teaching Lawyering Skills
Finally, we want to turn to the special impact of TJ on those of
us whose caseload, in whole or in part, involves the representation of
persons with mental disabilities. Each of us uses TJ as a teaching tool
in our clinical courses. In our class meetings, we both use case exam-
ples to teach TJ theory and practice. The following case is an example
of how KKG used a TJ perspective when teaching the lawyering skill
of counseling.
An externship student met with me to prepare for a counseling
session with a newly assigned client." 7 Over the course of several
informal meetings, I (KKG) attempted to use the insights and tools of
TJ to help the student prepare for and engage in an empathetic, infor-
mative legal counseling session. The TJ lens provided the student and
112. Juergens, supra note 103, at 363.
113. Ann Shalleck, Constructions of the Client Within Legal Education, 45 STAN. L. REV.
1731, 1740 (1993).
114. Id. at 1739.
115. See Hing, supra note 104, at 1823.
116. Ann Juergens, Using the MacCrate Report to Strengthen Live-Client Clinics, 1 CLINI-
CAL L, REV. 411,418 (1994).
In clinics, one experiences a defining characteristic of lawyering-responsibility for
another's affairs. In clinics, that responsibility will likely revolve around clients'
homes, children, freedom, employment, income maintenance, medical care or physical
security. Other persons' dignity, trust for the legal system, and sometimes survival are
in one's hands.
Id.
117. The way in which the clinical professor handles issues of client confidentiality and
case preparation may differ depending upon the type of clinic or externship in which the student
is enrolled and the scope of the professional relationship between the clinical professor and the
client. However, these issues are not the focus of the present article. For an article on externship
clinics, see Eyster, supra note 69, at 347.
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me with an initial framework from which the student could address
the core considerations involved in her representation of the client in
the counseling session and throughout their professional relationship.
I felt, in turn, that TJ gave me an interdisciplinary orientation within
which I could acknowledge the student's response to my teaching
methods and work through the student's reactions to the particular
case eccentricities.
The student came to me with the following information: the
client, Matthew Paskin (a pseudonym), was admitted to the psychiat-
ric ward of a city hospital on an emergency admission."' Two weeks
later and the day before a scheduled court hearing,"9 his lawyer (who
works for a publicly funded agency that represents institutionalized
psychiatric patients) was notified of Mr. Paskin's presence on the ward
and the placement of his case on the court calendar. The student, an
extern at the agency, accompanied the lawyer assigned to Mr. Paskin's
case to interview Mr. Paskin. The student observed the initial inter-
view, but did not participate. After interviewing the client, the attor-
ney and the student read Mr. Paskin's hospital record.
The student described Mr. Paskin as an articulate, intelligent,
angry, and extremely thin man dressed in many layers of ragged
clothes. Mr. Paskin had an unkempt beard and long hair. It was
obvious to the student that Mr. Paskin had not bathed in a long
time."'
During the initial interview, the student learned that Mr. Paskin
is the 41 -year-old son of a prominent psychiatrist. Mr. Paskin lived in
his own apartment located on a floor of his parents' brownstone. Mr.
Paskin did not seem to be delusional to the student. He told his attor-
ney that he has obsessive-compulsive disorder, that he was illegally
brought and committed to the psychiatric ward, that he refuses to take
a bath or take any medication, and that he wishes to return to his
apartment. He said that he was brought in because he was engaged in
an altercation with his neighbors. He also told his lawyer that he
wanted to go forward with the scheduled involuntary medication
hearing,' 2' even if it meant that the lawyer had less time to prepare and
118. A typical emergency admission statute permits the limited involuntary commitment of
a person brought to the hospital by the police and certified by a physician to be a danger to him-
self or others.
119. The hearings are held in a makeshift courtroom set up in the psychiatric center. This
room also doubles as a lunchroom for the lawyers working for the agency that provides represen-
tation to the patients at the psychiatric center.
120. During the interview, Mr. Paskin told his lawyer that he has not bathed in five years.
121. In this jurisdiction, the relevant standard for a hospital to override a patient's right to
refuse treatment is set out in Rivers v. Katz, 495 N.E.2d 337 (N.Y. 1986). The State bears the
burden of demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence the patient's incapacity to make a
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that he would most likely be facing an unfavorable judge. After the
initial interview, the attorney and the student returned to their offices.
The attorney called the psychiatrist on Mr. Paskin's treatment team
(the person most likely to testify against him at the hearing) and was
informed that the hospital was requesting a one week adjournment.
The case was then reassigned to the clinic student.
In approaching the meeting with the student, I discussed that the
first task was to define and set the goals for the counseling session.
Looking through the lens of TJ,"' I wanted the student to think about
the therapeutic or nontherapeutic parameters of the counseling session
and the upcoming hearing. I wanted the student to keep in mind the
goal of finding a legal outcome most supportive of the client's well-
being. I felt it was important to think about what factors the student
was prioritizing when trying to determine the client's emotional well-
being; how the student's perceptions might be influenced by issues of
gender, economic status, race, culture, or personal prejudices;123 what
insights and empirical information could be gleaned from social sci-
ence data as to how psychiatric patients view their lawyers, their legal
rights, or understand the legal process they are going through; and
what role institutional coercion may play in the decision-making
process.
Second, I wanted the student to consider what legal and nonlegal
steps needed to be taken to effectuate a therapeutic outcome. Was the
outcome that purported to support the client's emotional serenity
legally tenable? I suggested to the student that she prepare alternative
strategies so that the client and student could arrive at an informed
legal decision.124 The same considerations I mentioned with regard to
defining the goals of the counseling session came into play at this stage
as well, with the added concern that the student might become
treatment decision. The fact of involuntary commitment has no legal bearing on a patient's com-
petency to refuse medical intervention. If the court determines that the patient lacks the capacity
to determine the course of his own treatment, the court must determine whether the proposed
treatment is narrowly tailored to give substantive effect to the patient's liberty interest, taking
into consideration all relevant circumstances, including the patient's best interests, the benefits
and adverse effects associated with the proposed treatment, and any less intrusive alternative
treatments. Id. at 344.
122. See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
123. See, e.g., Hing, supra note 103; Michelle S. Jacobs, People from the Footnotes: The
Missing Element in Client-Centered Counseling, 27 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 345 (1997); Joan S.
Meier, Notes from the Underground: Integrating Psychological and Legal Perspectives on Domestic
Violence in Theory and Practice, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1295 (1993).
124. See generally Steven Zeidman, Sacrificial Lambs or the Chosen Few?: The Impact of
Student Defenders on the Rights of the Accused, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 853 (1996).
2000]
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invested in a particular predicted outcome, thereby becoming less
sensitive to hearing the client's voice. 
121
Third, I wanted the student to evaluate whether the steps needed
to effectuate the therapeutic outcome were acceptable to the client and
to the student. If not, the student had to investigate other alternatives.
Returning to Mr. Paskin's case, what factors were available to the
student to determine which result would give the client the greatest
sense of well-being? In this case the client had said what he wanted-
he wanted to go home, he did not want any medication, and he did not
wish to bathe. Mr. Paskin did not appear psychotic or delusional,
although he admitted to having obsessive-compulsive disorder. A
look at the hospital records revealed that Mr. Paskin was a fairly accu-
rate reporter. The records also revealed that Mr. Paskin's parents
were involved in his life.
Over the next few days, the student determined that she should
be thoroughly prepared to support the case resolution that seemed to
give Mr. Paskin the greatest emotional comfort. However, the student
had reservations about Mr. Paskin's chosen legal strategy, namely to
pursue the case on the earliest possible court date.
The student and I agreed that she must preliminarily research
the legal steps that had to be taken to effectuate the therapeutic out-
come. By reading the court papers, the student found out that Mr.
Paskin was scheduled for an involuntary medication hearing, at which
the hospital would ask the court's permission to give Mr. Paskin anti-
depressants and psychotropic medication and to insert a feeding tube
if Mr. Paskin did not gain weight at a pace that met with the hospital
staff s satisfaction. The student did preliminary research to determine
how Mr. Paskin could be released to go home, to defeat the hospital's
motion to involuntarily medicate him, and to resist the hospital's
efforts to bathe him. As to the first question, the student needed to
determine under what status the client was being held. Looking
through the hospital record, the student found that Mr. Paskin was
being held as a voluntary patient and that he had signed voluntary
admission papers when admitted to the hospital.126 In order to sched-
125. See Peter Margulies, Representation of Domestic Violence Survivors as a New Paradigm
of Poverty Law: In Search of Access, Connection, and Voice, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1071, 1098
(1995) (discussing the importance of voice as a process involving different relationships and,
thus, recognizing that clients have multiple voices).
126. In this jurisdiction, voluntary status does not entitle the patient to leave whenever he
or she may wish. Although it is a less restrictive status than involuntary commitment, a volun-
tary patient wishing to be discharged is required to write and file what is known as a "72-hour
letter" stating his or her desire to leave the hospital. The hospital must then respond in writing
to the written request within 72 hours. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.13 (McKinney 2000). In
practice, the only "writing" the patient may receive is a notice that his case for involuntary reten-
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ule a release hearing, Mr. Paskin would have to file what is known as a
72-hour letter. 127  It was not clear whether a release hearing could be
scheduled on the same day as the already calendared medication
hearing.
Next, the student researched the standard for involuntary medi-
cation 12 and tried to determine the likelihood that Mr. Paskin would
prevail at the medication hearing. The student had to take into con-
sideration which judge would hear the case. 129 The student needed to
consider how the client would appear to the judge, 3° and the effect his
appearance might have on the outcome of the case.
Third, the student had to determine if the hospital could be
stopped from giving Mr. Paskin a bath. When investigating this
issue, the student had to be sensitive to her own bias with regard to the
desired outcome. There was no doubt that Mr. Paskin was quite
tion has been placed on the court calendar.
If the hospital determines that the patient is not suitable for release, the hospital will put the
case on the court calendar and petition the court to involuntarily commit the patient. Id. Volun-
tary status becomes even murkier when one examines the underside of the voluntary admissions
process. Scholars have begun to question critically whether an actual difference exists in the way
that voluntary patients are treated once hospitalized. See James W. Ellis, Volunteering Children:
Parental Commitment of Minors to Mental Institutions, 62 CAL. L. REV. 840, 845-46 (1974).
Compare Stanley Herr, Civil Rights, Uncivil Asylums and the Retarded, 43 U. CIN. L. REV. 679,
722 (1974) (distinction between voluntary and involuntary often "illusory") with New York State
Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 752, 756 (E.D.N.Y. 1973) (volun-
tary residents at state school for retarded not treated differently than those who were involun-
tarily committed). See generally PERLIN, supra note 36, § 2c-7.2, at 481-88; Janet A. Gilboy &
John R. Schmidt, "Voluntary" Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill, 66 Nw. U. L. REV. 429, 452
(1971) (noting that in a study of voluntary admissions in Illinois, a majority of individuals who
voluntarily committed themselves did so under threat of involuntary commitment); John Mon-
ahan et al., Coercion and Commitment: Understanding Involuntary Mental Health Hospital
Admission, 18 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 249, 250-52 (1995). "[T]he voluntary-involuntary
distinction is an application quite blurred." Monahan, supra, at 251. "[R]esearch must tran-
scend the formal dichotomy of 'voluntary' and 'involuntary' legal status." Indeed, evidence
suggests that voluntary patients are subject to "abuse" and "substantial elements of coercion."
See id. at 259. The "distinctions between voluntary and involuntary hospitalization and treat-
ment are often murky." David B. Wexler, Foreword: Mental Health Law and the Movement
Toward Voluntary Treatment, 62 CAL. L. REV. 671, 676 (1974).
Voluntary patients may have even fewer opportunities to be discharged than involuntary
patients. Some literature suggests that voluntary patients are hospitalized twice as long as invol-
untary patients and are less frequently considered to have received maximum benefits from their
hospitalizations. See Robert A. Nicholson, Characteristics Associated with Change in the Legal
Status of Involuntary Psychiatric Patients, 39 HOSP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 424, 427
(1988).
127. See supra note 126.
128. See Rivers, 495 N.E.2d at 337. See also Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 135 (1992).
129. In this jurisdiction, the judges hearing the mental hygiene cases rotate on a weekly or
monthly schedule.
130. See Riggins, 504 U.S. at 138-45 (Kennedy, J., concurring). See also Marybeth Zientek,
Riggins v. Nevada: Medicated Defendants and Courtroom Demeanor from the Jury's Perspective, 30
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 215, 223 (1992).
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odorous. It was important for the student to be aware of the impact
this could have on the student's ability and desire to represent him
and to work toward Mr. Paskin's therapeutic outcome, particularly his
desire to avoid an involuntary scrubbing. From a TJ standpoint, the
student needed to think about and investigate why Mr. Paskin was so
resistant to bathing. As it turned out, Mr. Paskin had extremely rigid
rituals surrounding his washing and eating behavior. These rituals
guided his everyday behaviors. Interference with these rituals caused
Mr. Paskin to become so anxious that he avoided the entire washing
process.
The student's preliminary research indicated that Mr. Paskin
would have to file a 72-hour letter to schedule a release hearing. Also,
Mr. Paskin had, at best, a slim chance of winning the medication hear-
ing, and only if a sympathetic judge heard the case. The judge would
need to recognize that despite Mr. Paskin's appearance and somewhat
strange eating and washing rituals, he was not incompetent to make
treatment decisions. In addition, the judge would need to find that the
hospital was unable to substantiate its claim that without hospital care
Mr. Paskin would die of malnourishment. The student's research also
showed that the hospital, for the health and safety of others, has the
right to force Mr. Paskin to bathe.
At another meeting prior to the counseling session, the student
reexamined her original perceptions of the therapeutic outcome.
Although Mr. Paskin said that he wanted to go home, he signed vol-
untary papers. Perhaps going home was not really what he wanted to
do. It appeared that Mr. Paskin consistently refused any medical
intervention. He now needed to be informed of the consequences of
going forward with his case on the next court date. The student felt
that it was important to counsel Mr. Paskin that the lack of time avail-
able to thoroughly prepare his case could have a negative effect on the
outcome of the hearing and that the scheduled presiding judge was not
one likely to be sympathetic to restraining the hospital. Mr. Paskin
also needed to be counseled that there was no way to stop the hospital
from giving him a bath. This way he and his student-lawyer could
strategize about what action he wanted to take in response to the hos-
pital's decision to forcibly bathe him.
At another meeting, I discussed with the student the need to
reappraise the client's therapeutic outcome. In this case, during the
counseling session, Mr. Paskin decided not to put in a 72-hour letter,
to go to court on the scheduled date, and to resist nonviolently when
the hospital sought to bathe him, with the understanding that the
court would not support his action. He also informed the student that
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his parents were going to testify against him at the hearing. At this
point, the student made another appointment to meet with the client
the next day."'
This initial encounter is rich in fodder for the TJ fellow-traveler.
Although at first glance it may seem that I have demonstrated nothing
more than a client-centered approach to lawyering 132 -within the spe-
cial context of representing a person in a psychiatric center-on closer
inspection, I believe that I used TJ to systematically and explicitly
provide a "sharper conceptualization of and focus on"'33 an interdisci-
plinary approach to lawyering by focusing attention on the psycholog-
ical well-being of both the client and clinic participant. Therapeutic
jurisprudence does not take the place of more traditional skills training
methods, yet, it does give a different perspective, one that forces us as
clinical teachers and students to confront issues we may recognize on a
visceral level but do not cognitively acknowledge. Therapeutic juris-
prudence helps raise provocative questions about roles, perceptions,
and ethics, while promoting proactive lawyering' 34 I have used this
case to illustrate how TJ can frame an explicit orientation to the skill
of client counseling, but this case is also wonderful for exploring
clinical relationships, ethical dilemmas, institutional critique, theory of
the case, and trial advocacy.
B. The Collaborative, Reflective Classroom
I (MLP) co-teach-along with a practitioner who is director of
New Jersey's mental health advocacy office-an upper level course,
Mental Disability Litigation Workshop and Seminar. 3 ' The students
spend two hours in class and the equivalent of a full day in externship
placements. Most students work with field offices of a New York state
public interest law office that provides legal services to individuals fac-
ing involuntary civil commitment. Others work with the correctional
health services office of a municipal department of health. Still others
work in a public interest law office that represents persons with mental
disabilities on law reform or test cases. Occasionally, students will
work in the office of counsel for private psychiatric hospitals.
131. The case continued after the student left for the semester. It was eventually appealed,
found moot, and returned to the trial court for a new hearing to consider the client's changed
circumstances.
132. See supra note 81.
133. Stolle & Wexler, supra note 8, at 29.
134. See generally Stolle & Wexler, supra note 8; PRACTICING TJ, supra note 18.
135. With very few exceptions, all students in this course have taken either Mental Health
Law or Criminal Law & Procedure: The Mentally Disabled Defendant as a prerequisite.
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The classroom component includes transcripts of "ordinary"
involuntary civil commitment hearings and insanity retention hear-
ings, that is, cases that are not notorious because of the individuals
involved, a subsequent appellate court decision, or a high-publicity
incident that led to the hearing. The class also incorporates readings
on the folkways of involuntary civil commitment practice,136 the vol-
untary hospital admissions process, 137 the role of counsel, 131 the roles
of forensic mental health professionals, "sanism, prete142, xuliy 4
and therapeutic jurisprudence, as well as cases that highlight some
of the issues that are the focus of these readings)4 3 Classroom discus-
sions on both students' placement experiences and on the readings,
both consciously and unconsciously, incorporate TJ principles.
When students present on their placement experiences (either
discussing cases to which they have been assigned 44 or projects on
which they have been working), 4 ' they regularly apply TJ principles
as part of their analysis. They assess the role and behavior of the law-
yer with whom they are working, the opposite lawyer, the judge and,
often, other court personnel. They focus on the critical moment of
their case (perhaps a bench ruling on the admissibility of hearsay evi-
dence, a conversation with a client's siblings as to a potential aftercare
placement, or an interaction with a hospital doctor about a patient's
responsiveness to a certain medication), and apply TJ principles in
deconstructing that moment. In my colloquies with the students, I
136. HOLSTEIN, supra note 65.
137. See, e.g., Susan C. Reed & Dan A. Lewis, The Negotiation of Voluntary Admission in
Chicago's State Mental Hospitals, 18 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 137 (1990).
138. See, e.g., John J. Ensminger & Thomas D. Liguori, The Therapeutic Significance of the
Civil Commitment Hearing: An Unexplored Potential, 6 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 5, 15-19 (1978);
Perlin, supra note 57.
139. See Michael L. Perlin, Power Imbalances in Therapeutic and Forensic Relationships, 9
BEHAV. SCI. & L. 111 (1991).
140. See, e.g., Perlin, On "Sanism," supra note 35.
141. See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, Morality and Pretextuality, Psychiatry and Law: Of
"Ordinary Common Sense," Heuristic Reasoning, and Cognitive Dissonance, 19 BULL. AM. ACAD.
PSYCHIATRY & L. 131 (1991).
142. See, e.g., David B. Wexler, Putting Mental Health into Mental Health Law: Therapeu-
tic Jurisprudence, 16 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 27 (1992); David B. Wexler, Justice, Mental Health,
and Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 40 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 517 (1992).
143. E.g., In re Melton, 597 A.2d 892 (D.C. 1991) (interpreting conflicting evidence in
involuntary civil commitment case); Goetz v. Crosson, 769 F. Supp. 132 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (exam-
ining the right to independent expert witness at involuntary civil commitment hearing), affd in
part & rev'd in part, 967 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1992), on remand to 838 F. Supp. 136 (S.D.N.Y. 1993),
affd, 41 F.3d 800 (2d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 821 (1995).
144. Students placed in law offices are typically assigned commitment cases to prepare for
trial and, in some cases, to take to trial.
145. Students assigned to the correctional health services office work on such issues as the
availability of compassionate leave for individuals who are near death.
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regularly call on them to reflect on their experiences through TJ filters
and ask them to conceptualize ways that the representation process
might more closely align with TJ principles. I also employ the same
devices in discussing classroom readings and case transcripts.
An example may be of help. In one case, a student was assigned
to work with the New York Mental Hygiene Legal Services office at
Bellevue Hospital, and as part of her work, she was asked to assist in
the representation of Alan Andrews (a pseudonym). An examination
of the case revealed hidden issues, two of which were especially
susceptible to a TJ analysis.
Andrews was a 68-year-old homeless white male who had been
brought to Gotham Psychiatric Hospital (a pseudonym) by New York
City Transit police from the Ferry Terminal in lower Manhattan,
where he had been living. The Transit Police believed it necessary to
bring Andrews to Gotham Hospital because they found him with
blood all over his hands. Andrews' bloody hands were a result of his
(false) belief that leeches were all over his body. He would scratch
himself until he bled in a futile effort to remove these imaginary
leeches.
In his first meeting with our student, Andrews was, according to
the student (Lisa), generally very calm when he spoke, but became
anxious when he talked about certain topics. One was the fact that he
was supposed to be receiving $1,200 per month in pension money
from the Railroad Retirement Fund, stemming from his years as a
railroad conductor. Since becoming homeless, he had not received any
of this money.
To Lisa, the most striking thing about Andrews was that he was
always holding a little yellow magnifying glass up to his eyes. In their
first meeting, Lisa did not ask him about it or understand its signifi-
cance, but afterward she reported, "Looking back, it seems that I
thought the [patient's reliance upon the] magnifying glass was merely
a manifestation of his illness. However, I later learned that the magni-
fying glass was the Hospital's makeshift solution to his extreme visual
impairment., 1
46
Once aware of this, Lisa immediately inquired as to the proper
channels for obtaining the needed eyeglasses for Andrews, but was
immediately faced with "an incredible amount of resistance":
Both his psychiatrist and his social worker seemed surprised by
my "zealous" representation of my client. They seemed
146. This and other data in the Andrews case come from file notes made by Lisa and from
memos that she submitted to me as part of her work on this case. Lisa is now a senior trial
attorney with the New York Mental Hygiene Legal Services.
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annoyed by my constant inquiries. In fact, I got into one very
heated argument with the social worker, when she began to yell
at me, accusing me of attempting to do her job. I tried to
explain (with as much deference as I could muster) that the real
problem was that she was not doing her job.
Lisa decided that her first priority was to try to obtain eyeglasses
for her client before his commitment hearing. Here she noted, "I
realized that my initial reaction to his magnifying glass was probably
not unusual. I had thought it was an indication of his illness and
abnormality. I knew that a judge would be likely to think the sam
thing."
Her attempts were initially thwarted by what she characterized as
an "incredibly bureaucratic system." Andrews' visual impairment
she observed, although a subject of many notes in his chart, was
"obviously not a priority to the staff. With each inquiry I made, I was
met with a new excuse."
She continued,
First, I was told, "Gotham does not do glasses." I simply would
not accept this as a fact. Here was a patient suffering from both
a psychiatric diagnosis and a severe visual impairment. This
was a patient who imagined things that were not there (e.g.,
leeches) and at the same time could barely see. I could not
accept the fact that the hospital was only willing to treat his
psychiatric condition with medication and wholly refuse to
address his visual handicap.
I asked the doctor, "Isn't it possible that his deficient visions
could be related to his hallucinations? If you can't see, is it not
possible that you might believe things are there which are not?"
I was told that my hypothesis was possible; nonetheless, the hos-
pital simply refused to pay for my client's glasses. Now this did
not end my efforts as Mr. Andrews apparently had--on paper-
more than enough money to pay for his glasses. But no one at
the hospital was making any effort to locate his $1200 per month
pension that had been accumulating since he became homeless.
With a couple of telephone calls, I was able to locate the pension
fund and arrange for the hospital to set aside a sufficient sum of
money to pay for my client's eyeglasses. However, I was then
told that my client would have to leave the hospital grounds in
order to obtain the glasses. This did not appear to be an obsta-
cle, since Mr. Andrews was viewed as an excellent patient and
had earned "level 4 off-ward privileges" (meaning that he could
leave the hospital grounds if accompanied by a staff member).
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But, the hospital told me that, because of the under staffing,
there was no staff person available to accompany him to the eye
doctor. This led me to ask myself this question: "If he can't use
his off ward privileges to obtain this pair of glasses (that he
desperately needs), then of what benefit are these privileges to a
patient?"
Unfortunately, I was unable to obtain glasses for my client prior
to his hearing, and he was retained at [Gotham Hospital].
Whether the judge's decision was affected at all by the magnify-
ing glass, I will never know. However, in the course of the hear-
ing, there was testimony about the magnifying glass and my
client's dire need for eyeglasses. After my externship had ended,
I later learned that Mr. Andrews, while a patient at [Gotham],
finally obtained a pair of glasses.
Our classroom discussion of Lisa's case was rich and far-reaching
and repeatedly focused on TJ principles. Our students knew from the
substantive law portions of the seminar, their clinical placements, and
prior course work, that patients have a constitutional right to adequate
medical care'47 and a statutory right to control their own funds)48 In
the past fifteen years, no serious arguments have been raised question-
ing the legal foundation of these rights. And yet, Andrews' case came
to Lisa's attention not because of alleged violations of either of these
rights, but rather because he was resisting involuntary civil commit-
ment.
Class conversation about Lisa's work on Andrews' behalf zeroed
in (without any overt urging or prodding from either professor) on the
TJ aspects of Lisa's work and the commitment process. The ques-
tions raised in the classroom discussion of Andrews' case included the
following:
" Why are health care issues not cognizable at involuntary civil
commitment hearings?'49
" Did the hospital doctors consider the impact that sightlessness
might have on the patient's mental state and his legal commit-
ability?
147. See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315 (1982).
148. See, e.g., Shields v. Katz, 533 N.Y.S.2d 451 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988); N.Y. MENTAL
HYG. LAW § 29.23 (McKinney 2000).
149. See, e.g., Matter of D.J.M., 386 A.2d 870 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978), discussed
in PERLIN, supra note 36, § 2c-8.1, at 508.
20001
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SWhy did the hospital administrators not exert pressure sua
sponte on hospital social work staff to obtain glasses for
Andrews and to insure that he had access to his pension
money?
" Why did the hospital not recognize the pretextuality of an
administrative scheme that purportedly allowed patients to go
"off grounds" but failed to provide necessary staff to the
patient offgrounds?
" What were the TJ implications concerning the reality that
hospital staff line workers predictably become hostile to
student externs seeking to provide representational services to
indigent inpatients when the student's work appears to go
beyond the carefully circumscribed boundaries of the involun-
tary civil commitment hearing?1"'
The class discussed Lisa's case over at least a month-long period.
In may ways, it seemed to define the semester. The frustration that
Lisa felt in seeking to provide top-quality representational services (in
light of bureaucratic obduracy and passive aggression) was reflected in
the ways that other students empathized with both Lisa and her client.
This empathy arises from another important purpose of TJ in
clinical teaching: increasing the students' awareness that attempts to
provide excellent lawyering (without question, Lisa provided truly
excellent lawyering, and her work could serve as a model for both law
students and young lawyers assigned to such cases) can be met with
roadblock after roadblock. Furthermore, these roadblocks can often
thwart even the most advocacy-minded legal professionals.
Lisa's case was not the only one in which TJ values shaped class
discussion or case analysis. 5 ' But, it did serve as a near-perfect "real
150. The issues at an involuntary civil commitment hearing are whether the defendant is
mentally ill, and if so, whether, as a result of his mental illness, he is dangerous to himself or
others. See, e.g., Scopes v. Shaw, 398 N.Y.S.2d 911 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977); N.Y. MENTAL
HYG. LAW § 9.35 (McKinney 2000).
151. For instance, Alison, another student, was assigned to work with lawyers for a local
agency that provided health services to inmates at a city correctional facility. She worked on
what are termed "compassionate release" cases: applications to courts to suspend the remainder
of criminal sentences so that inmates with terminal AIDS can be released to die at home or in a
hospice established specifically to care for persons with AIDS.
In our classroom discussions, we specifically considered TJ arguments that Alison could
make-and did make-in seeking to persuade judges that, notwithstanding records of felony
convictions, her clients should be released so that they could "die with dignity." See N.Y. CRIM.
PROC. LAW § 210.40 (McKinney 2000). See generally PERLIN, supra note 36, § 14.16B, at 346-
55 (Cum. Supp. 1999).
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case" to teach, analyze, deconstruct, and reconstruct from TJ perspec-
tives. 112 When I tracked down students from that semester's class and
asked them if they could remember a case in which we discussed TJ
issues, each student responded, "Lisa's guy with the eyeglasses."
VI. CONCLUSION
To return to the Bob Dylan lyric that gave this paper part of its
title, clinical teachers and clinical students spend much of their time
"in the basement/Mixing up [the] medicine." '153 For the purposes of
the clientele that our students represent, Dylan's next couplet is just as
telling: "I'm on the pavement/Thinking about the government."154
In 1965, Dylan wrote with profound suspicion and distrust about
a government that was to be feared and avoided. 5 Institutional
mental health consumers and other persons disadvantaged by social
perceptions concerning their ethnicity, gender, or socio-economic
status have ample reason when they are out "on the pavement" to be
"thinking about the government." The use of therapeutic jurispru-
dence in clinical teaching offers new tools to teachers and students
when they are pondering the fate of marginalized persons who remain,
all too often, out "on the pavement" and "thinking about the govern-
ment."
152. A professor crafting a hypothetical can always manipulate the facts to make more per-
fect teaching tools. The fact that this was a "real" case added a dimension simply unreachable in
hypothetical cases.
153. DYLAN, supra note 13.
154. Id.
155. Bob Dylan wrote in the second verse
The phone's tapped anyway...
They must bust in early May
Orders from the D.A....
Keep a clean nose
Watch the plain clothes
You don't need a weather man
To know which way the wind blows.
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